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light of the legal autopoiesis theory, the final result of which is the judgment. Reading it, 
one can find plain arguments both for the effective protection of EC freedoms, including the 
freedom of establishment, one the one hand, and for stopping regulatory and tax competition, 
and safeguarding the national interests of Member States, on the other one. The methodology 
of legal autopoiesis may be useful in better understanding of the message the judgment has 
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The concept of confrontation 
 
This paper has been prepared in the hope of giving new insights into the above-
mentioned case. The respective ECJ judgment can be interpreted, based on its 
wording.1 It seems to be more important, however, to try to explore the process 
  
 ∗ Professor of Law, Corvinus University of Budapest, Institute of Business Law, 
H-1093 Budapest, Fővám tér 8.; Research Fellow, Taxation Law and Policy Research 
Institute, Monash University, Melbourne  
E-mail: daniel.deak@uni-corvinus.hu  
 1 The case of 446/03 Marks & Spencer v. David Halsey concerns the ability of a 
profitable UK parent company to offset losses generated by its overseas subsidiaries under 
the UK group relief rules. The case was referred to the ECJ. The ECJ made its judgment 
on 13 December 2005, referring the case back to the High Court for resolution. The ruling 
of the High Court was challenged before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals 
entered its judgment on 20 February 2007. The House of Lords Appeals Committee 
refused to grant an appeal against the Court of Appeals judgment.  
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of communication as well, the final result of which is the judgment. Community 
and tax law commentators have cited this case more widely than any other 
direct tax case before. Perhaps not surprisingly, the judgment is not unambiguous. 
One can find plain arguments both for the effective protection of EC freedoms, 
including the freedom of establishment, one the one hand, and for stopping 
regulatory and tax competition, and safeguarding the national interests of 
Member States, on the other one. The methodology of legal autopoiesis may 
be useful in better understanding of the message the judgment has negotiated.  
 
 
I. Major theses of the legal autopoiesis theory  
 
An analytic viewpoint that highlights stability in social practice with regard to 
the interaction between a system and its environment is an integral part of the 
sociology as elaborated already by Talcott Parsons: „one very highly generalized 
way of conceptualizing a minimal aspect of a system might be to consider it an 
area of relative non-randomness.”; „Not only must system boundaries, by some 
mechanism(s), be maintained in relative integrity, but by some mechanism(s) 
the system must both draw ‘sustenance’ from the environment and ‘defend itself’ 
against extreme environmental fluctuation. At the boundary of the system–
permeable, open to environmental impingement and intrusion–there must be 
filtration mechanism, accepting and rejecting possible environmental inputs, 
and regulatory mechanisms minimizing environmental fluctuation either by 
direct action into the environment toward control of its relevant aspects or, at 
least, by neutralizing those effects of such fluctuation as cannot effectively be 
controlled.”2  
 From the viewpoint of the sociology of functionalism (Malinowski) and 
neo-functionalism (Merton, Parsons, Luhmann), it can be highlighted in social 
practice what is congruent while the macro conditions of social structure are 
unaffected. From the perspective of functionalism, what has remained in our 
view on social practice is residual, instead of taking into account the big 
categories of the production and reproduction schemes of social relationships 
(social classes, capital entitlement and poverty, the conflict between North and 
South, etc.). Thus, one can take a look at the various patterns of social integration 
(like redistribution or reciprocity) or at the process of the internal reconstruction 
  
 2 Ackermann, Ch.–Parsons, T.: The concept of ‘social system’ as a theoretical device. In: 
McQuarie, D. (ed.): Readings in contemporary sociological theory: from modernity to 
post-modernity. Englewood Cliffs, 1995. 24 [from: Direnzo, G. J. (eds.): Concepts, theory 
and explanation in the behavioural sciences. New York, 1966].  
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of argumentative discourse where the inter-subjective use of a common language 
will be developed. Functional differentiation (into the spheres of economy, law, 
sciences, religion, etc.) is a basic development of the Western-type modern history.  
 From the viewpoint of late functionalist sociology, social life cannot merely 
be described by the traditional categories of class conflicts, the ownership of 
the means of production or the nation state. As a product of modernisation, 
in the Western societies it has been more relevant to focus on the events of com-
munication. This way, the monological view of society can be overcome by 
relying on communicative rationality, as identified by Jürgen Habermas.  
 With the onset of modernisation, individuals have been liberated from pre-
economic control. A social community is able to organise itself as civil society, 
independent of its nation state. In addition to the autonomous forms of social 
activities, autopoietic (self-referential) systems can emerge as well. As explained 
by Niklas Luhman, in a theory of such self-referential systems, the traditional 
link of the idea of self-reference to consciousness as the basis of operation is 
abandoned. Thus, the theory of “subject-ness” of consciousness (subiectum or 
hypokeimenon) and the primacy of the epistemological difference between object 
and subject are rejected. Instead, two kinds of operations are distinguished, i.e., 
self-reproduction and observation.3 An empirically ascertainable connection exists 
between the principle of differentiation of social systems and the form, in 
which subsystems differentiate themselves in society, being self-referentially 
closed, and open to their environment.4 In late functionalist sociology, what is 
causal will be replaced by what is structural.  
 Given the phenomenon of the autopoietic development of society, a certain 
break with Kantian methodology can be explained by Luhmann as follows: the 
voluminous empirical research on causal attribution teaches us that in the 
matter of causality there is no way of avoiding selective judgments, and this 
shifts the question of the essential causes into the question of the structural 
conditions of the causal plan used. Autopoietic systems need not be transparent 
to themselves; they find nothing in themselves that could be regarded as an 
undeniable fact of consciousness and applied as an epistemological a priori 
principle; the assumption of an a priori is replaced by recursivity itself.5 
 Whereas classical scientific thought holds a paradigm to be a “linkage through 
inputs” (the outside determines the changes in the system), the paradigm of 
  
 3 Luhmann, N.: The unity of the legal system. In: Teubner, G.: (ed.): Autopoietic law: 
A new approach to law and society. Berlin, New York, 1988. 13.  
 4 Ibid. 31.  
 5 Luhmann, N.: Closure and openness: On reality in the world of law. In: Teubner 
(ed.): Autopoietic law… op. cit. 336.  
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“linkage through closure” can be proposed as an alternative: it is the internal 
coherence of the system that determines its development. Then autopoietic 
systems define themselves against the background of an environment.6 The 
differentiation of a legal system is based on the distinction between normative 
and cognitive expectations. Legal systems are to combine the closure of 
recursive self-reproduction and the openness of their relation to the environment 
(closure in normativity and openness in their cognitive respect).7  
 The conceptualization of social systems brings about three important changes 
in social theory:8  
– a radical temporalisation of social systems, meaning that the elements of 
social life are not stable, but are “events”;  
–  what has to be maintained in a society is the recursively closed organi-
sation of an open system (closure in operation); and  
– observation itself is an operation of an autopoietic system (openness in 
cognition).  
 According to the theory of Niklas Luhmann (on the unity of the legal 
system)9  
– legal acts are those communicative events that change legal structures;  
– the legal system is defined by the circular relationship between legal acts 
and legal norms; and  
– the interplay of closure and openness is represented in the legal system 
by the combination of normative closure and cognitive openness.  
 Jean-Pierre Dupuy supplies three different interpretations of how the legal 
system can be open and closed at the same time:10  
– closure and openness refer to different domains of the legal system 
(normatively closed, cognitively open);  
– legal closure implies legal openness (order from noise11); and  
– self-transcendence of a normative order can be explored (see Robert 
Nozick’s theory of entitlements with its self-referential character of procedural 
justice or Friedrich Hayek’s theory of law as a spontaneous social order).  
  
 6 Ost, F.: Between order and disorder: The game of law. In: Teubner (ed.): Autopoietic 
law… 73.  
 7 Luhmann: The unity of the legal system. In: Teubner (ed.): Autopoietic law… op. 
cit. 19–20.  
 8 Teubner, G.: Introduction to autopoietic law. In: Teubner (ed.): Autopoietic law… op. 
cit. 3. For concept summaries of the autopoiesis and legal autopoiesis theories, see 
separate annexes below.  
 9 Ibid. 4.  
 10 Ibid. 5.  
 11 Atlan, H.: Le crystal et le fume. Paris, 1979. 5, 41, 56.  
 CONFRONTATION RE: LEGAL AUTOPOIESIS THEORY IN OPERATION…  149 
  
 Law that negotiates reflexive communication provides procedures without 
intervening in the internal matters of the subjects-at-law. In the beginning of the 
20th century, Georg Jellinek identifies the term of legal reflex with the indirect 
effect of law in the absence of explicit statutory law provisions.12 According to 
Gunther Teubner, reflexive law is characterised by a new kind of legal self-
restraint. Instead of taking over regulatory responsibility for the outcome of 
social processes, reflexive law restricts itself to the installation, correction, and 
re-definition of self-regulatory democratic mechanisms.13  
 According to Teubner, autopoiesis does not exclude evolution, but implies 
a redefinition of evolution. The questions that can be raised in this respect are:14  
– How does the legal system evolve into autopoietic closure?  
– How does legal evolution operate after an autopoietic closure of the legal 
system?  
 The proposed solutions are as follows:  
– The first question can be answered with reference to the construction of 
a hyper-cycle (pre-autopoietic evolution–socially diffuse law develops higher 
forms of autonomy via the cyclical constitution of its system components).  
– The second question can be answered with reference to internalisation 
(post-autopoietic evolution–legal development is coupled to broader social 
developments by specific mechanisms of co-evolution).  
 Upon applying the legal autopoiesis theory to real life, it is crucial to 
explain changes in the environment (structural couplings). Luhmann explains (in 
his theory on closure and openness) that the theory of self-referential systems 
leads inevitably to the following dilemma: on the one hand, no system is in a 
position to operate outside its boundaries, on the other, structural evolution requires 
the assumption that a system’s environment produces effective constraints on 
the system. Luhmann’s proposal for the solution consists in a distinction15 between 
internal information processing and external constraints.16 As to the realisation 
of external constraints, the following can be highlighted:  
– the materiality continuum as the material-energetic basis of meaning 
systems; and  
– the simultaneous presence of events in several meaning processing systems.  
  
 12 Jellinek, G.: Allgemeine Staatslehre. Berlin, 1914. 69–70.  
 13 Teubner, G.: Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law. Law and Society, 17 
(1983) 239.  
 14 Teubner: Introduction to autopoietic law. In: Teubner (ed.): Autopoietic law… op. cit. 8.  
 15 Ibid. 10.  
 16 As an antecedent, see Ashby’s theory on a cybernetic system that can be defined as 
one “open to energy but closed to information and control”; Ross Ashby, W.: An introduc-
tion in cybernetics. London, 1956. 4.  
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II. Application of the legal autopoiesis theory to the case of C-446/03 
Marks & Spencer  
 
1. Temporalisation of law: flexibility in the application of the very same 
statutory schemes  
 
Legal rules are being replaced by legal acts which are simply communicative 
events (enouncements) appearing in the legal order. Teubner asserts17 that legal 
rules lose the strategic position they once had as core elements of law. In a 
switch from structure to process, the central elements of a legal order are 
“énoncés”, communicative events, being legal acts, and not legal rules. It has 
proved to be hopeless to search for a criterion delineating social norms from legal 
ones. The decisive transformation cannot be found in the inherent characteristics 
of rules, but in their insertion in the context of different discourses.  
 From the perspective of the legal autopoiesis theory, the case of C-446/03 
Marks & Spencer can be seen as a product of the temporalisation of legal institu-
tions. It is embarrassing to admit, how difficult it is to interpret this case. The 
story can be told in different ways, depending on the standpoint the story-teller 
has held. Surely, one can realise the legal acts as communicative events that 
may change legal structures. Key to understanding this case is to appreciate 
the degree of flexibility of the national tax administration in applying statutory 
schemes. In the specific case, the UK loss relief regime is put in the context of 
the question as to whether the UK parent company should be granted a last 
resort. The question is answered (in the affirmative) as a result of a series of 
discussions. At the end of the process of communication, an answer is given, 
which cannot yet be repeated in the same way in another case.  
 The facts that are relevant to the particular legal case do not really provide 
solution (for a summary of facts, see the separate annex below). It would be 
misleading just to focus on the mere facts as covered by statutory law schemes. 
For example, a particular meaning could be given to the legal fact that the UK 
consortium system is different from the Scandinavian loss contribution system. 
It is still more interesting to look behind the pure facts. The UK consortium 
system is not deemed to be inconsistent with Community law. The competent 
UK tax authority is, however, expected to apply national law in a manner, which 
is friendly enough for the purposes of the effective enforcement of taxpayer 
rights in association with the EC freedom of establishment. The legal acts of 
the tax authority may lead to real changes in the legal structure. While the 
  
 17 Teubner, G.: Global Bukowina: Legal pluralism in the world society. Teubner (ed.): 
Global law without a state. Aldershot, 1997. 
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UK tax law on consortia does not require generosity, the application of it to a 
particular case does require taking into account how effectively taxpayer 
rights can be exercised. The legal acts of the tax authority may thus imply the 
possibility of a last resort to the effective protection of taxpayer rights, not 
arising purely from the legal facts.  
 It is important to distinguish between the internal conception and organisa-
tion of a national tax system and the possible effect of its operation on the 
exercise of EC freedoms. The Community legislator, like the Council or the 
Commission, or judiciary bodies like the ECJ, must not interfere with the internal 
organisation of a national tax system. They can halt, however, their operation 
where the application of national tax law results in the unjustifiable restriction 
of EC freedoms. The application of particular national tax rules constitutes com-
municative events–and resources of the self-generation of Community law–at the 
time when they commence interaction with the exercise of fundamental freedoms.  
 
2. Closure in operation and openness in cognition, order from noise and self-
transcendence 
  
No sub-systems can be reasonably supposed unless they are close in their 
operation and open in their capacity of observation at the same time. Structural 
coupling and openness to its actual environment cannot thus be interpreted 
without the presupposition of normative closure. A subsystem will not be 
closed due to its simple separation from its environment. It will be closed in 
the process of communication with its actual environment only, at the end of 
which both the system and its environment will be changed.  
 Closure in operation and openness in observation do not only mean that they 
refer to the different domains of a legal system. It also means that, paradoxically, 
legal closure implies legal openness. In other words, law–as reflexive law–fills 
in an autopoietic system the role of installation, correction and redefinition of 
self-regulatory mechanisms. It provides filtering of non-legal events through 
the lens of law. As already Kelsen explains, “the law is like King Midas. 
Whatever he touched was immediately changed into gold; likewise, everything 
the law has to do with becomes law”.18 Due to a series of communicative events, 
a type of order can be developed without antecedents. Namely, these develop-
ments cannot be interpreted based on the simple causality or the study of the 
relationship between what is objective and subjective. This way, order can be 
  
 18 Ost: Between order and disorder… In: Teubner (ed.): Autopoietic law… op. cit. 79; 
Kelsen, H.: Pure theory of law. Berkeley, 1967. 369.  
152 DÁNIEL DEÁK 
  
evolved from “noise”, a normative order can emerge that is able to justify it-
self by way of self-transcendence.  
 Despite the common assumption of a common static view of law, the actual 
meaning of legal norms may be instable. This is because different elements of 
the sets of legal norms may be called forth, depending on the circumstances. 
Coping with the vulnerability of such norms requires a kind of relational way 
of thinking. A correspondence theory is operational, provided that the facts 
relevant to legal decisions do not change in an abrupt, comprehensive manner. In 
the instance where there is no longer stability in the relevant meaning of legal 
institutions, harmony cannot be achieved between the legal norms and the ever-
changing outward reality. Harmony can, however, be reached in another respect, 
suggested precisely by a coherence theory. Legal institutions may produce 
harmony in discrete micro relations where the applicable norms are coherent and 
the people involved in them have developed their sense of communication, 
adequate to the particular case.  
 A legal system can eventually be expected to have provisions that are in 
conformity to each other. This is a holistic idea of law, based on the assumption 
of system-oriented conformity. That is, legal sources need to be interpretable 
in a close-circuit system, which is legitimised in itself. Recursive reasoning is 
not given from the outset: it appears at the end of a process of communication. 
A good judgment may benefit from the communication completed in the court 
room. Submissions, statements and declarations of judges and litigating parties 
are made in interaction with each other. At the end of this process, a ruling 
should emerge which contributes to the strengthening of the consistency and 
integrity of law. A good judgment is an example of the coherence to be 
achieved during the litigation process.  
 
(i) Simultaneous application of the principles of fiscal cohesion and the effective 
enforcement of rights  
 
The case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer cannot be solved without under-
standing a micro system of the effective enforcement of taxpayer rights in the 
light of Community law, which is normatively closed and cognitively open. In 
general, Community law has been developed without relying on the legitimising 
force of a nation state. Instead, it has been evolved over the decades due to the 
practice of the citizens to apply it as a system of law, which is autonomous, 
takes priority over national law, implies a number of provisions with direct 
effect, and provides for the effective protection of individual rights. The 
Community law product of “acquis communautaire” and the judiciary practice 
developed by the ECJ have never been posited by single nation states. They 
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have been evolved due to the functional differentiation of Community law 
itself. Community law is still open to the changes taking place in its social 
environment. For instance, in the recent three or four years, more emphasis 
has been placed on the application of the EC Treaty to specific cases than on 
interpreting the EC Treaty in a rather innovative way, with the result of 
developing judiciary law.  
 The judgment in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer can rely on the Community 
case law developed on the assessment of the restrictions of national legislation 
on the freedom of establishment, and on the possible justification of these 
restrictions. The process of applying the non-restriction principle to direct tax 
cases started with C-264/96 ICI and has been open to date. Furthermore, it has 
been uttered, among other things, in the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer that:  
– the territoriality principle of taxation, as recognised in the C-250/95 
Futura Participations case, needs to be respected;  
– the fiscal cohesion principle as introduced in the C-204/90 Bachmann 
case must not be interpreted too narrowly, that is to say, only in relation to the 
same taxpayer and the same item of tax liability; and  
– the competent tax authority must not disregard if there is any instance for 
the taxpayer in the UK to recognise for tax purposes (and carry over) the losses 
sustained in another Member State; as a last resort, the relief of the cross-
border loss transfer must be granted.  
 The Community law, being applicable to the case of C-446/03 Marks & 
Spencer, and consisting of the above components, can be considered as a 
normatively closed system. It can be interpreted as a result of the combined 
application of the principles to the single case, which otherwise are in contradic-
tion with each other. The Community law, serving as a basis for the decision 
in the C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, has been developed progressively during a 
process of about half of a decade as a result of the assessment of the restrictions 
on the freedom of establishment by national tax legislation and the evaluation 
of their possible justification.  
 The Community law, applicable to this case, can still be regarded as a 
cognitively open system. Notably, the fiscal cohesion principle has been altered 
significantly since its formulation in the C-204/90 Bachmann case. The EC 
Court of Justice has been careful in applying this principle since the time the 
C-204/90 Bachmann case was decided, giving all the less opportunity for its 
application. More importantly, the non-restriction principle has been extended 
to direct tax cases even by providing for the granting of tax relief as a last resort. 
This constitutes evidence for the right of citizens to exercise the freedom of 
establishment even in direct tax cases. The UK can be implicated in the case 
of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer. This is because it has infringed both the 
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effectiveness principle (Article 10 EC) and the proportionality principle (third 
Paragraph of Article 5 EC) to the extent that the taxpayer would unreasonably 
suffer from the non-recognition of tax losses and, in particular, from the fact 
that the restriction on the cross-border loss-transfer would go beyond what is 
necessary in order to protect the national tax base.  
 
(ii) Emergence of the principle of equivalence, applicable to direct tax cases  
 
The judgment in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer has created a new language. As a 
result, a new view has formed on the old items of EC harmonisation, the non-
restriction of fundamental freedoms and the effective protection of taxpayer 
rights. The principles of fiscal cohesion, non-restriction and effectiveness 
cannot be regarded in the same way, as it was the case before. Through the 
decision in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, a new type of balance between the 
territoriality principle of taxation and the non-restriction principle has been 
achieved so far.  
 It is a major development that, for the first time, the equivalence principle 
as enshrined in Article 100b of the Maastricht Treaty has been applied to a 
direct tax case. This means first that national tax systems can be developed 
due to the recognition of the sovereignty of Member States in the formulation 
of their system of taxation and economic policy. A Member State is expected 
secondly, however, to take into account that its own legal institutions need to 
be compatible with its counterparts, i.e., the law adopted in another Member 
State. Once the discrepancy between national legislations constitutes an obstacle 
to the exercise of fundamental freedoms, it must be eliminated. The non-
recognition of the losses with the Luxembourg subsidiary of Marks & Spencer 
UK in the UK represents such a discrepancy, although the UK is not requested 
to change its statutory law.  
 Article 95 EC on internal market legislation requires the advanced forms of 
harmonisation compared to the common market legislation, even though not in 
the area of taxation. The Article 95-based power of Community legislation 
may be in contradiction with the subsidiarity principle (second Paragraph of 
Article 5 EC). However, the principle of subsidiarity does not call into question 
the powers conferred on the Community by the EC Treaty. It is still true that 
Article 95 does not give the Community exclusive power to legislate. It gives 
a certain competence only for the purposes of improving the conditions for the 
functioning of the internal (single European) market by eliminating barriers 
from fundamental freedoms and removing distortions of competition.19  
  
 19 C-491/01 BAT, ECR 2002. I-11453, Paras 178–179.  
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 Entitlement for the transfer of a Member State’s regulatory power to the 
Community level comes from the specific conferment of the power principle 
(first Paragraph of Article 5 EC). It is reflected in the joined cases of C-154/04 
Alliance for Natural Health, Nutrilink and C-155/04 National Association of 
Health Stores where the EC Court of Justice has confirmed its practice that the 
disparities between Member States do not require harmonisation, taken by 
itself. Harmonisation is necessary only where disparities in national legislation 
disturb the smooth operation of the internal market, and it is therefore necessary 
to remove those disparities.20 By virtue of the EC Court’s case-law, a mere 
finding of disparities between national rules is not sufficient to justify having 
recourse to Article 95 EC (Para. 28 of the quoted judgment). The Court explains 
(in Para. 78 of the joined cases of C-154/04 and C-155/04): the procedure of 
the so-called comitology21 is intended to reconcile, on the one hand, the 
requirement for effectiveness and flexibility, arising from the need regularly to 
amend and update aspects of Community legislation in the light of develop-
ments in scientific understanding in various areas and, on the other hand, the 
need to take account of the respective powers of Community institutions.  
 The need of coordination between Member States does not prejudice the 
basic principle that Member States enjoy freedom in deciding matters that do 
not require a higher level of decision. The national competence of regulation 
of one Member State cannot be exercised, however, without taking into account 
what is happening in another Member State. For example, where a lady 
insured in France, staying in Germany is in a need of hospital treatment in 
Berlin, the French national authority of social security cannot refuse giving its 
permission for this treatment outside France and reimbursing her for the costs 
of treatment where it has turned out that on her stay away from France it was 
not possible to provide her with treatment in France without delay that would 
be equivalent to treatment provided in Berlin.22  
 A Member State is not obliged to co-operate with another Member State 
unless the denial of coordination with the other Member State would prevent 
citizens from exercising their fundamental rights across the Community. The 
EC Court made use of this principle in the Marks & Spencer case as well: for 
the lack of a fiscal nexus established in the UK, the United Kingdom is not 
obliged to grant the opportunity of carrying over the losses of a Luxembourg 
subsidiary to a UK parent company unless the UK taxpayer proves that in 
  
 20 European Court Review, 2005. I-06451, Para. 28.  
 21 Report from the Commission on the working of the Committees during 2001, COM 
(2002) 733 final.  
 22 C-56/01 Patricia Inizan, European Court Review 2003. I-12403, Para. 60.  
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Luxembourg there is no way of recognising for tax purposes any loss carry 
over. This is something new in the Advocate General’s opinion that he would 
extend the equivalence principle as enshrined in Article 100b of the Maastricht 
Treaty to the matters of direct taxation, that is, to a territory where Member 
States traditionally enjoy freedom.23  
 
(iii) Striking a balance between instances of fighting against trafficking in 
losses and granting a last resort to cross-border loss carry over  
 
The starting point for the ECJ in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer is its concern that 
the arbitrage in jurisdictions and trafficking in cross-border losses needs to be 
stopped. Clearly, the ECJ is anticipated to combat tax avoidance or the abuse 
of Community law. This is one aspect of the complexity only the EC Court has 
to encounter, however. The other one is equally important. That is, the taxpayer’s 
right to exercise the EC freedom of establishment needs to be effectively 
protected. The EC Court must not stop therefore at the point of combating the 
abuse of law. It has to assure at the same time that national tax law measures 
will not unreasonably put restrictions on one of the fundamental freedoms that 
can be exercised in the internal market.  
 Our thesis in this paper is that the EC Court cannot make a link between the 
two opposite goals unless it has recourse to legal autopoiesis. It will not be 
successful in striking a balance between the two extremes unless it is able to 
create “order from noise”, by starting to apply the equivalence principle to a 
direct tax case in parallel with the aspiration of stopping tax avoidance. The 
equivalence principle purports that both ideas need be protected equally and 
simultaneously: citizens need be prevented from the abuse of law, but they need 
be assured at the same time that they will not be prevented from exercising 
fundamental freedoms.  
 The EC Court is taking a hard look at whether the taxpayer has fully 
exhausted the possibilities of loss carry over, including all affected jurisdictions. 
If not, legal autopoiesis is not invoked. If so, it is because the grant of a last 
resort shall be accompanied with the warning given about avoidance and abuse.  
 The assumption of equivalence is of a theoretical nature. It starts operating, 
however, where communication between the jurisdictions of Member States is 
a problem. National jurisdictions are not requested to be unified. They are, 
however, expected to be compatible with each other, and national public 
  
 23 C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, European Court Review 2005. I-10837, Para. 59, 
opinion of AG L. Poiares Maduro, Paras 76–77.  
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authorities need to start communicating with each other accordingly, whenever 
it is necessary.  
 The assumed operation of legal autopoiesis is not static. The legal positions 
to be taken will depend on how particular factual circumstances will be 
developed. They are thus open to changes that will be elaborated, provided 
that the legal acts associated with these changes will be successful, leading to 
communication with a view to reaching balance and coherence in the case under 
discussion. This is the filtration effect by law of the non-legal environment. The 
non-legal considerations of combating avoidance and abuse are not refuted, 
and they are not accepted either: instead, they are digested and reformulated. 
Legal autopoiesis is thus a matter of dynamics.  
 One can learn from the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer that tax law 
does not resist economic reality; rather, it starts reshaping economic reality 
from non-law into law. In tax cases, conflicts do not arise between law and 
economic policy in and of itself but between law and economic policy–as they 
stand at the outset–and the redefined law that appears at the end of the process 
of communication between the factors of law and non-law.  
 The emergence in tax law of anti-avoidance rules is not a matter of the 
intrusion of economic policy considerations into the body, form or language of 
tax law, but the corollary of the collapse of traditional legal institutions that 
are not able to provide taxpayers any longer with sufficient guidance. The 
emergence of anti-avoidance rules is the consequence of a failure of the law 
used up to the time when taxpayers become engaged in tax avoidance. A court 
decision that reflects a problem of tax avoidance does not lead simply to the 
assertion of a new type of law. It can happen to do so only if legal and non-
legal systems go through the filter of self-referential law, producing a new 
order of law. This is precisely what happened in the case of C-446/03 Marks 
& Spencer: the EC Court spelled out the law on granting a taxpayer a last 
resort, following the exhaustion of all opportunities for loss carry over across 
the border.  
 
(iv) A micro perspective of the approximation of national laws in direct tax 
matters  
 
The work of autopoiesis is largely constrained by the outward (non-legal) society. 
It can only emerge where the process of functional differentiation has reached 
a sufficiently high level of social consensus and welfare. Where poverty and 
degradation prevails, no autopoiesis can be developed. Autopoiesis is not a macro 
category of social structure. It can only occur as an exception, that is, from 
time to time where all the conditions for its development are fulfilled.  
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 Importantly, the autonomy of a legal system can only be interpreted from 
case to case. The standpoint taken by the ECJ in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer 
suggests the approximation of Community law, although not by way of statutory 
legislation. As an alternative to the bureaucratic coordination of Member States, 
harmonisation can be achieved, although in the micro sphere of the judgment 
made in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer. This micro perspective of harmonisation 
also means that it must be redefined in another legal case. What has been stated 
in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer is not necessarily valid in another case. It is there-
fore a matter of communicative legal acts to be taken whether a new quality of 
legal autonomy and coherence is developed in a new case, again in a micro 
situation.  
 A major source for harmonisation is not necessarily the Member States’ 
agreement of their political will top-down. One has to explore citizens as well 
who may experience restrictions on their exercise of fundamental rights from 
case to case, due to the lack of harmony in the Member States’ statutory 
legislation. In such cases, it is ultimately not the question of harmonisation that 
can be raised. Instead, it is the enforcement of civil rights, which is at stake. 
Harmonisation, if any, is the inadvertent consequence of creating the possibility of 
the enforcement of civil rights. This is a micro perspective of harmonisation, 
which still does not invalidate the relevance of agreements on harmonisation, 
to be made on a macro level of the institutions of official policy.  
 Micro-level harmonisation might be seen as a reason for generating casuistic 
legislation in the instance that the issue of correcting national legislation arises 
from the limited outlook of the specific problem. This correction must still not 
be considered as a new branch of national legislation. Instead, the legislator’s 
goal is to make adjustment to national laws in order to achieve harmony in 
implementing national law in line with its counterpart, effective in the other 
Member State. The adjustment required by the individual case can take place 
in terms of modifying the respective national law, releasing implementation 
decrees or guidance for the interpretation of the law applicable to the case, 
with a view to bringing national law in accordance with its counterpart. This 
process can be seen as a matter of adjustment rather than the creation of new 
law in a spontaneous way.  
 With regard to the above ECJ cases, we need not require from France to 
change its law on social security. It can even be maintained that the French 
legislator does not have to do anything other than to harmonise the implemen-
tation of rules on the reimbursement for the costs of the hospital treatment 
made outside France with the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty. The UK 
is not expected to change its tax system of loss carry over either. It is only 
important to assure that the UK tax law is to be read in accordance with the 
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EC Treaty and, if necessary, make provisions to ensure that exceptional foreign 
losses can be recognised for domestic tax purposes despite the missing fiscal 
nexus, provided that the taxpayer does not have an opportunity to effectuate 
loss carry over for tax purposes in any of the affected jurisdictions. In these 
cases, a Member State is invited to amend its legal practice in order to avoid 
impeding the exercise of fundamental freedoms. It is up to the Member State 
to determine which legislative or other measures will be taken to achieve the 
desired harmony.  
 
3. Evolution from diffusion into coherence: reconciliation of conflicting 
principles (constructing a hyper-cycle) and showing sensitivity to tax 
 competition (internalisation)  
 
The evolution of an autopoietic legal system can be explained (i) by a hyper-
cycle of the development of diffuse law into autonomy and coherence, and (ii) 
by means of internalisation, that is, by coupling with major social develop-
ments. The particular law that has been applied in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer 
has not existed before. It has been developed through the various processes of 
communication followed by the lawyers specialising in tax law, Community 
law and public international law. There were judges, EC servants, legal advisers 
and scholars both in the UK and abroad who pursued the disputes.  
 It was not clear in advance of this process of communication, what emphasis 
should be placed on the different principles of Community law that could be 
applied to a case like that of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer. In particular, it was 
not clear in which combination these principles could be applied. Due to the 
hyper-cycle of the development of the Community tax law related to C-446/03 
Marks & Spencer, diffusion could be transferred into coherence. Diffusion has 
been turned into coherence as a result of reconciling with each other the 
principles of fiscal cohesion and the non-restriction of fundamental freedoms. 
It has been possible to forge a particular quality of law–this has achieved a 
fine balance–, which can still be interpreted from opposite directions, depending 
on where the emphasis is placed in fact.  
 In addition to the hyper-cycle of the development of the relevant Community 
law, coupling with social changes was also necessary. It was not possible to 
take out of consideration that Members States have been all the more 
susceptible to preserving their sovereignty in legislating their own national tax 
system. At the same time, it must not be disregarded either that EC freedoms 
would be undermined if it were precluded to give special relief in specific 
circumstances, and remove administrative barriers accordingly from the 
smooth operation of the internal market.  
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 Furthermore, the EC Court of Justice struck a particular balance as a result 
of coupling with the Member States current policies. In the case of C-446/03 
Marks & Spencer, it was first of all at stake as to how policy expectations will 
be reflected in the ECJ judgment to give more emphasis to the subsidiarity 
principle and to stop tax competition. Following the accession in 2004 of a number 
of law tax jurisdictions, a new meaning had to be given to the internalisation of 
Community law at a particular phase of its development. Sensitivity to the 
harmful effects of regulatory and tax competition, or to the abuse of Community 
law could not be taken out of consideration any longer. At the same time, the 
achievements of the internal market legislation could not yet be given up.  
 
4. Structural couplings: exploring the obstacles to Community law freedoms 
and identifying the legal basis for the removal of these obstacles in a 
changing environment  
 
It is a question whether an autopoietic system of law, once it has been developed, 
is able to survive despite the changes in its environment. This suggests the task 
of (i) filtering the diverse interpretations of the materiality continuum, and (ii) 
identifying the components that may qualify the events in several meaning 
processing systems, relevant to the specific legal case. The materiality continuum 
arising from outward meaning bases is manifested in restrictions by national 
legislation on fundamental freedoms that need to be overcome. Disparities in 
national tax laws cannot be considered taken by themselves as obstacles to the 
exercise of EC freedoms. Hence, they are not to be eliminated, except in cases 
where the different legal forms of different jurisdictions are comparable with 
each other. However, coherence in Community law cannot be achieved unless 
one day the dispersion and diffusion, arising from the differences in national 
legal measures is removed.  
 In addition to the filtration of outward influences (by way of information 
processing), identifying complex events (as external constraints) is also important. 
Disparities arising from national loss relief regimes parallel to each other need 
to be removed, in the event that they impede the smooth operation of the 
internal market. For instance, a Member State may be in a position to choose 
legislative means that serve the integrity of the national tax system, but which 
are still less restrictive than they would otherwise be.  
 It can be important to encounter the changing external constraints on the 
process of internal information processing. Openness of an autopoietic legal 
system to energy flows means that it is vulnerable to outward changes in meta-
juridical values. Where non-legal values are not digested and built in the 
particular micro-system of law, coherence cannot be achieved that would 
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otherwise be necessary for the development of autonomy, or rather of the self-
generation of the system itself. A vast array of the possible solutions, proposed 
by the profession of Community tax lawyers has been filtered by the EC Court 
of Justice, arriving at a decision in the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer. 
The communicative process of developing the particular law, which can 
provide the basis for a final decision, has not yet been concluded by the ECJ 
decision. The national court, deciding eventually in the case, may have much 
elbowroom in formulating its final standpoint. To date, it has been the practice 
of the EC Court to leave all the more room for the national court to assess the 
relevant circumstances, and freely decide the case on its merits.  
 
 
III. Lessons to be taken from the angle of the legal autopoiesis theory  
 
1. Filling the gap left in national law by the recursively closed organisation 
of interpreting and applying Community law  
 
A vocabulary of analysing the texts of the ECJ judgment, the AG opinion and 
the national court decisions following the ECJ judgment may consist in 
particular of the following terms:  
 – legal acts as communicative events;  
 – normative closure and openness in cognition, order from noise, reflexive law;  
 – hyper-cycle of pre-autopoietic evolution, internalisation upon post-auto-
poietic evolution; and  
 – structural couplings (internal information processing and coping with 
external constraints).  
 The Community law principles applicable to the case of C-446/03 Marks & 
Spencer deliver arguments in two opposite directions. Some of them serve for 
the protection of the UK sovereignty in legislating direct tax matters; others 
can be used in favour of the taxpayers’ freedom of establishment. The principles 
that belong to the first type are as follows:  
 – territoriality principle of taxation; and  
 – fiscal cohesion principle.  
 The principles that belong to the second type can be enumerated as 
follows:  
 – proportionality principle;  
 – equivalence principle; and  
 – effectiveness principle.  
 It is not difficult to follow the ECJ argument aimed at the protection of the 
Member State’s position on the ground of the territoriality principle. Nor is it 
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problematic to apply the fiscal cohesion principle either as a means of justifying 
restriction on the freedom of establishment. Furthermore, its meaning has even 
been broadened significantly to the extent that fiscal cohesion can now be 
interpreted widely, that is, not only in respect of the same taxpayer and the 
same item of tax liability.  
 By way of contrast, it is a novelty of the ECJ decision to see the way in 
which the proportionality principle has been utilised. It was used until the time 
of the decision in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer in the sense that restrictive 
national measures can be challenged or approved, depending on whether they 
meet the proportionality test. The ECJ decision is new, however, at the point 
of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer that the UK national legislation is subject to the 
proportionality test in the instance where there is no explicit restriction by 
national law on an EC freedom that would be plainly inconsistent with 
Community law. The proportionality principle would then be left in a vacuum. 
This is not yet the case in point because the gap arising from the lack of 
explicit restrictive national law measures is filled by the special meaning of 
Community law, suggested by the profession and represented by the ECJ. The 
expression of this meaning is a result of the recursively closed organisation of 
interpreting and applying Community law. The law–generated as an order from 
noise–is the result of the redefinition of Community law, without interfering 
yet with the sovereignty of a Member State in legislating direct tax matters. 
The law that has been developed in deciding the case of C-446/03 Marks & 
Spencer is the product of self-generation, that is, it has been developed in the 
absence of a peculiar legislator who would have been authorised to adopt the 
applicable law.  
 A key to understanding the decision in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer resides 
in the EC Court’s assessment of whether the opportunity of loss carry over for 
the company group has been fully exhausted in the particular case. It is not the 
UK law, strictly speaking, which is being evaluated. No single legal measure 
of the UK tax law has been condemned in the abstract. It is the UK legal 
practice that has been condemned, not proven friendly enough in a particular 
case. No statutory provision of the UK tax law has been challenged. The UK 
law has been criticised, however, because its impact has been detrimental, 
constituting a restriction on the taxpayer’s right for cross-border loss carry 
over. This way, the UK law has resulted in an infringement of the effectiveness 
principle, not providing the taxpayer any guarantee for the effective protection 
of his or her rights.  
 Interestingly, the follow-up UK legislation has in fact resisted the Community 
law developed in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, having implemented the ECJ 
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decision. The UK reaction to the ECJ challenge was to make changes in 
statutory law,24 the result of which has been the introduction  
– of a statutory regime that allows in principle the carry over of qualifying 
cross-border losses; and  
– of detailed provisions made in the Finance Act 2006 on the conditions, 
in which a UK company group is in a position as to know whether it has 
exhausted the possibilities to have the loss taken into account in the jurisdiction 
of a non-resident subsidiary.  
 Importantly, on 10 April 2006 the High Court gave its judgment on the 
question as to what the relevant time is at which point the parent company has 
to demonstrate that all possibilities have been exhausted in order to take into 
account for UK tax purposes the losses sustained by the overseas subsidiary. 
The High Court ruled that the relevant time for determining if conditions exist 
for cross-border group relief is the later time when the group relief is claimed, 
not when the losses arise. This position is consistent with the logic arising 
from the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. However, it is different 
from the said provisions of FA 2006.  
 The main issue is still not whether the reaction of the UK legislation is 
severe or generous for the purposes of the exercise of taxpayer rights. It is 
more important to emphasise that the UK legislator was quick in filling the 
gap left by the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, breaking the process of 
self-generating Community law. It is not precluded, however, that the inter-
pretation of the principles of effectives and equivalence will receive fresh 
impetus from the profession by developing new aspects of the old principles, 
from now on based on new statutory law.  
 
2. Conclusions  
 
It is clear from the above analysis that  
– the legal actions (statements, explanations, arguments, etc.) of the legal 
representatives of taxpayers and of public authorities, finding and applying the 
proper law cannot be described as simple equivalents of naked statutory law structures, 
like the UK loss relief regime (this development is associated with a phenomenon that 
  
 24 The UK has already revised its group relief laws, allowing qualifying losses from an 
EEA subsidiary to offset income of a UK parent company (with a 75% ownership at least). 
The UK has still introduced provisions in the Finance Act 2006 to give effect to the ECJ 
Marks & Spencer decision. As a result, the FA 2006 provisions are very difficult to satisfy. 
See: Downs, A.: Marks & Spencer: A case for pro-European tax harmonization. The CPA 
Journal, 78 (2008) Jan. Commission Communication on the tax treatment of losses in 
cross-border situations [SEC (2006) 1690], COM (2006) 0824 final.  
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can be called the temporalisation of legal institutions);  
 – normative closure and cognitive openness can be developed due to the 
combined effect of the concurrent application of the principles of fiscal cohesion, 
the non-restriction of fundamental freedoms and the effective enforcement of 
rights, applicable in a particular context to the case of C-446/03 Marks & 
Spencer (simultaneous view of a single case);  
 – a peculiar legal order as a new quality of Community law can be devel-
oped (one can explore order from noise) due to the emergence of the equivalence 
principle applicable to direct tax matters in parallel with the aspiration of 
stopping the trafficking in losses (emergence of the idea of equivalence);  
 – the judgment in C-446/03 Marks & Spencer is bounded to the particular 
time when the taxpayer, seeking to get access to cross-border loss carry over, 
is granted a last resort, following the exhaustion of all the opportunities that 
would have been available for him or her before (striking a balance);  
 – harmonisation can be achieved on a micro level as a consequence of 
creating the possibility of the enforcement of taxpayers’ rights, while not 
invalidating the relevance of legislative steps, taken by Community bodies on 
a macro level of official policy (happening on a micro level);  
 – reconciliation of conflicting principles with regard to reaching equilibrium 
between national and Community law (constructing a hyper-cycle of pre-
autopoietic evolution) is possible, and sensitivity of public bodies to the harmful 
effects of tax competition, or to the abuse of Community law (internalisation 
upon post-autopoietic evolution), is growing (evolutionary aspect of autopoietic 
law); and  
 – filtration of diverse interpretations of law and digesting the changing 
external constraints on the ECJ practice made in direct tax matters are necessary 
(producing structural couplings).  
 It follows from the above that the theory of legal autopoiesis, as applied to 
the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, seems to show the characteristics as 
enumerated below. Thus, it  
 – explores temporality in law;  
 – comprises simultaneous events;  
 – embraces the idea of equivalence;  
 – is able to strike balances; 
 – is understandable on a micro level;  
 – brings about reconciliation of conflicting ideas and sensitivity to crisis 
phenomena; and  
 – contributes to the filtration of diverse interpretations of law and to the 
removal of discrepancies.  
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 There are a few policy issues that can be raised in connection with the 
application of the legal autopoiesis theory to the case of C-446/03 Marks & 
Spencer. They can be summarised as follows:  
 
 (i) Does it make sense that relief should be available only where there is no 
relief in the jurisdiction of the subsidiary? How would foreign rules that 
terminate the right to loss set-off after a period fit into this framework?  
 
 (ii) Why should a group be entitled to relief in respect of the losses of the 
foreign subsidiary when the group did not have to pay tax on the subsidiary’s 
profits?  
 
 (iii) If a Member State allows the free export of capital by taxpayers, why 
should it have to allow free export when the taxpayer decides to establish a 
subsidiary? Are EC Treaty rights for the benefit of humans or of companies? 
Why should a company, which is fictional, be entitled to the rights of this 
kind?  
 
 The above questions can be answered in brief as follows:  
 
 (i) Yes, it does. For the UK, it is important to preserve the integrity of its 
national tax system and resist the trafficking in cross-border losses. This is a 
materiality continuum (as explained by Luhmann), however, that needs to be 
taken into account. It should be overcome as long as national tax legislation 
endangers the exercise of EC freedoms, in particular, the freedom of establish-
ment. Foreign rules on the carry over of losses need not be taken into account 
in general. However, the UK is obliged to check if the opportunities of setting 
off foreign losses have been exhausted. If so, the UK has to provide a last 
resort, which comes from the normative closure of the Community law, applicable 
to the case of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer. A new order can be developed from 
noise to the extent that a balance can be reached between the tax competences 
retained by the Member States and the requirement of the freedom of move-
ment, flowing from the idea of the internal market. For the achieving of this 
result it is also required that the normatively closed Community law applicable 
to this case be cognitively open.  
 
 (ii) A company group could be entitled under national law to the UK relief 
of the transfer of cross-border losses even if no tax is paid on the profits of the 
subsidiary in the UK because the lack of this relief would discourage the UK 
parent company from extending its business to another Member State through 
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forming a subsidiary there. This position comes from the equivalence principle 
applicable now to a direct tax case. According to this principle, to have useful 
effect, Article 43 EC requires the national authorities competent to grant the 
tax advantage at issue to take account of the advantages likely to be afforded by 
the legislation of the state, in which the subsidiaries of the group are established. 
This solution comes from the reflexive nature of Community law. By virtue 
of this reflexive nature, the national tax law need not be changed. A Member 
State is still required to give a last resort if there is no alternative to the 
restrictive national law on cross-border loss carry over. Otherwise the freedom 
of establishment–an integral part of the operation of the internal market–would 
be unjustifiably restricted.  
 
 (iii) The EC Treaty has been designed for European citizens. This comes 
from the requirement of free competition and the smooth operation of the 
common market–from 1993 on, the internal market–whereby citizens may 
widely benefit from the principles of the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital. The freedom of establishment arises from the freedom of 
citizens to extend their business to another Member State by establishing there 
their branches or subsidiaries (freedom of persons) there. According to the ECJ 
practice, the freedom of establishment can be carved out from the free move-
ment of capital where citizens (or companies) can exercise decisive influence 
over their vehicle of investment made in another Member State. It can neatly 
be explained by means of the legal autopoiesis theory why companies–a legal 
fiction–may be entitled to exercise rights that are otherwise available for 
citizens. Corporations can be seen from the viewpoint of the corporatist pheno-
menology in a process of collectivisation where groups can emerge as the 
instrument of gathering and enforcing individual interests. A corporation as a 
legal entity can be interpreted in the light of reflexive law. In order to grasp the 
substrate of a legal person, it is not sufficient to refer to a system of actions, to 
the group of persons, to peculiar funds or to decision schemes. Rather, it is 
necessary to get involved in the analysis of reflexive communication as well. 
To this end, a business organisation must be discerned as a unit of the process 
of collectivisation. The two sides of collectivism are the realm of collective 
imagination (solidarity as interpreted by Parsons) and the reality of the 
corporative body (capacity for actions in concert as suggested by Parsons).25  
  
 25  Teubner, G.: Unternehmenskorporatismus. Kritische Vierteljahresschrift, 3 (1987) 70; 
Ackermann, Ch.:–Parsons, T.: The concept of ‘social system’ as a theoretical device. In: 
McQuarie D. (ed.): Readings in contemporary sociological theory… [from: Direnzo (eds.): 
Concepts, theory and explanation… op. cit.] 
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IV.  Appendix  
  
(i) Main proceedings in the C-446/03 Marks & Spencer v. David Halsey case 
as summarised by the ECJ in its judgment  
 
“18 Marks & Spencer is a company incorporated and registered in England 
and Wales. It is the parent company of a number of companies established 
in the United Kingdom and in other States. It is one of the leading United 
Kingdom retailers of clothing, food, homeware and financial services.  
19 From 1975 Marks & Spencer began to move into other States, with the 
opening of a store in France. By the end of the 1990s it had sales outlets in 
more than 36 countries, with a network of subsidiaries and a system of 
franchises.  
20 A trend towards increasing losses became evident in the mid-1990s.  
21 In March 2001 Marks & Spencer announced its intention to divest itself 
of its Continental European activity. By 31 December 2001 the French 
subsidiary had been sold to third parties, while the other subsidiaries, 
including those established in Belgium and Germany, had ceased trading.  
22 In the United Kingdom, Marks & Spencer claimed group tax relief pursuant 
to paragraph 6 of Schedule 17A to the ICTA in respect of losses incurred 
by its subsidiaries in Belgium, Germany and France for the four accounting 
periods ended 31 March 1998, 31 March 1999, 31 March 2000 and 31 March 
2001. It is clear from the file before the Court that both parties to the main 
proceedings agree that the losses must be computed on a United Kingdom 
tax basis. At the tax authority’s request, Marks & Spencer therefore 
recomputed the losses on that basis.  
23 Each of the subsidiaries had operated in the Member State in which it had 
its registered office. The subsidiaries had no permanent establishment in 
the United Kingdom and had never traded there.  
24 The claims for relief were rejected on the ground that group relief could 
only be granted for losses recorded in the United Kingdom.  
25 Marks & Spencer appealed against that refusal before the Special Com-
missioners of Income Tax, which dismissed the appeal.”  
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(ii) Expression of the legal autopoiesis theory in the wording of the judgment 
 of C-446/03 Marks & Spencer  
 
The particular statements of the judgment and the AG opinion can be structured, 
depending on how they are associated with the components of the legal 
autopoiesis theory. The result of this is depicted in a series of tables below.  
 
 
Components of legal 
autopoiesis theory  AG opinion  ECJ judgment  
Legal acts as 
communicative 
events, taxpayer 
claims and tax 
authority reaction–
looking behind the 
pure legal facts  
 
It is neither the intention, nor 
the avowed aim of 
Community law to call in 
question the limits inherent in 
any power of taxation or to 
disturb the order of priority 
of the allocation of tax 
competences as between 
Member States; it should be 
recalled that, in the absence 
of Community 
harmonisation, the Court is 
not competent to interfere in 
the conception or 
organisation of the tax 
systems of the Member 
States  
(Para. 60)  
 
… it is clear from the file 
before the Court that both 
parties to the main 
proceedings agree that the 
losses must be computed on 
a United Kingdom tax basis; 
at the tax authority’s request, 
Marks & Spencer therefore 
recomputed the losses on 
that basis; each of the 
subsidiaries had operated in 
the Member State in which it 
had its registered office; the 
subsidiaries had no 
permanent establishment in 
the United Kingdom and had 
never traded there.  
(Paras 22–23)  
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Components of 
legal autopoiesis 
theory  
 
AG opinion  
 
 
ECJ judgment  
 
Post ECJ 
history  
Normative closure 
and openness in 
observation; order 
from noise–
application of the 
principles of 
proportionality and 
effectiveness in the 
absence of explicit 
national law 
measures that 
would infringe 
Community law  
 
The proposed 
judgment is a solution, 
which requires the 
authorities of the 
Member State 
concerned to take 
account of the tax 
situation of companies 
not resident in its 
territory; being 
complex, yet in the 
absence of Community 
harmonisation, only a 
solution of this kind 
allows a balance to be 
maintained between 
the tax competences 
retained by the 
Member States and the 
requirements of 
freedom of movement 
flowing from the 
internal market  
(Para. 83)  
The restrictive 
measure at issue in 
the main pro-
ceedings goes 
beyond what is 
necessary to attain 
the essential part of 
the objectives 
pursued where:  
– the non-resident 
subsidiary has 
exhausted the 
possibilities 
available in its State 
of residence of 
having the losses 
taken into account 
for the accounting 
period concerned by 
the claim for relief 
and also for 
previous accounting 
periods, if 
necessary by 
transferring those 
losses to a third 
party or by offsett-
ing the losses 
against the profits 
made by the 
subsidiary in 
previous periods,  
… (Para. 55)  
The High 
Court ruled 
that the 
relevant time 
for 
determining if 
conditions 
exist for 
cross-border 
group relief is 
the later time 
when the 
group relief 
claim is made, 
not when the 
losses arise 
(otherwise the 
parent 
company 
could hardly 
make use of 
the transfer of 
cross-border 
losses)  
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Components of legal autopoiesis 
theory  AG opinion  
ECJ 
judgment  
Reflexive law–application of the 
equivalence principle (no interference 
with the national legislation on its 
merits)  
 
It follows that the margin of 
manoeuvre granted to the 
Member States in order to 
justify their tax regimes is 
excessively reduced; for that 
reason, it is necessary, as 
Advocate General Kokott 
recommended, to relax those 
criteria; to that end I propose to 
revert to the criterion of the aim 
of the legislation at issue; 
cohesion must first and foremost 
be adjudged in light of the aim 
and logic of the tax regime at 
issue (Para. 71)  
 
Justification based on cohesion 
of the system of relief can be 
accepted only if the foreign 
losses may be accorded 
equivalent treatment in the State 
in which those losses arise 
(Para. 76)  
 
A solution of that kind based on 
the comparison and equivalence 
of the treatment accorded in 
various Member States has 
already been developed by the 
Court in regard to health 
services in the context of 
national social security systems  
(Para. 77)  
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Components of 
legal autopoiesis 
theory  
 
AG opinion  
 
 
ECJ judgment  
 
Post ECJ 
history  
Hyper-cycle of 
pre-autopoietic 
evolution–
reconciliation of 
conflicting 
considerations 
(reaching 
equilibrium)  
 
The conflict between 
the power conferred on 
the Member States to 
tax income arising in 
their territory and the 
freedom conferred on 
Community nationals 
to establish themselves 
within the Community 
cannot be saved; this 
gives rise to a tension 
between two opposing 
systems and to the need 
to establish an 
equilibrium in the 
allocation of 
competences as 
between the Member 
States and the 
Community (Para. 6)  
The fact that it does 
not tax the profits 
of the non-resident 
subsidiaries of a 
parent company 
established on its 
territory does not in 
itself justify 
restricting group 
relief to losses 
incurred by 
resident companies 
(Para. 40)  
 
 
Internalisation 
upon post-
autopoietic 
evolution–
showing 
sensitivity to a 
new accent of 
harmonisation 
(showing more 
sensitivity to tax 
competition)  
 
The national legislation 
is not precluded from 
making entitlement to 
cross-border loss relief 
subject to the condition 
that it is established 
that the losses of 
subsidiaries resident in 
other Member States 
cannot be accorded 
equivalent tax 
treatment in those other 
Member States  
(Para. 82)  
Member States are 
free to adopt or to 
maintain in force 
rules having the 
specific purpose of 
precluding from a 
tax benefit wholly 
artificial 
arrangements 
whose purpose is to 
circumvent or 
escape national tax 
law (Para. 57)  
Lack of 
internalisation 
by making 
changes in the 
UK statutory 
loss relief 
regime  
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Components of 
legal autopoiesis 
theory  
AG opinion  
 
ECJ judgment  
 
Materiality 
continuum–
restrictions by 
national legislation 
to be overcome  
 
Within the group the claim is 
made by the parent company 
resident in the United 
Kingdom which is subject 
under that head to unlimited 
fiscal obligations in that 
country; in regard to it the tax 
competence of that Member 
State is not limited; in those 
circumstances the United 
Kingdom is not entitled to 
rely on the principle of 
territoriality in order to refuse 
to a company within a group 
resident in its territory the 
grant of an advantage 
connected with the transfer of 
losses  
(Para. 63)  
The United Kingdom and the 
other Member States which 
submitted observations in the 
present proceedings claim 
that, from the aspect of a 
group relief system such as 
that at issue in the main 
proceedings, resident 
subsidiaries and non-resident 
subsidiaries are not in 
comparable tax situations; in 
accordance with the principle 
of territoriality applicable 
both in international law and 
in Community law, the 
Member State in which the 
parent company is established 
has no tax jurisdiction over 
non-resident subsidiaries 
(Para. 36)  
Identifying the 
particular meaning 
of simultaneous 
events–removing 
disparities arising 
from national loss 
relief regimes 
parallel to each 
other, provided that 
they impede the 
smooth operation 
of the internal 
market  
 
The difficulties ensuing for 
economic operators as a result 
of mere differences in tax 
regimes as between Member 
States are outside the scope of 
the EC Treaty; in particular it 
is well established that the 
differences in treatment 
resulting from legislative 
disparities as between the 
Member States do not 
constitute discrimination 
prohibited by the Treaty  
(Para. 23)  
In so far as it may be possible 
to identify other, less 
restrictive measures, such 
measures in any event require 
harmonisation rules adopted 
by the Community legislature 
(Para. 58)  
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(iii) Key terms relating to the legal autopoiesis theory: temporality, closure and 
  openness, evolution and structural couplings  
 
Temporalisation:  there are not legal facts, but events; legal acts are communicative events that change legal structures.  
Interpreting of how the 
legal system can be open 
and closed at the same 
time:  
– closure and openness refer to different domains of the 
legal system (Luhmann: normatively closed, cognitively 
open);  
– legal closure implies legal openness (order from noise–
Atlan: le crystal et le fume);  
– reflexive law (Teubner); and  
– self-transcendence of a normative order (Dupuy).  
Evolution of the 
autopoietic legal system 
(Teubner):  
– construction of a hyper-cycle (pre-autopoietic 
evolution–socially diffuse law develops higher forms of 
autonomy via the cyclical constitution of its system 
components); and  
– internalisation (post-autopoietic evolution–legal 
development is coupled to broader social developments 
by specific mechanisms of co-evolution).  
Interpreting changes in 
the environment:  
a distinction between internal information processing 
and external constraints needs to be taken into 
consideration (Ashby: a cybernetic system is open to 
energy but closed to information and control); there are 
two mechanisms of environmental couplings:  
– materiality continuum is the material-energetic basis of 
meaning systems; and  
– simultaneous presence of events in several meaning 
processing systems.  
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(iv) Table: Legal autonomy and autopoiesis26  
 
Legal autonomy Legal autopoiesis 
Independence from internal factors  Operating a particular selective 
mechanism for responding to the 
environment  
Autonomy is a matter of degree, ranging 
from autarchy to total dependence  
Autopoiesis is an all or nothing category  
Independence as freedom from outside 
control  
Independence as self-dependence  
Non-correspondence to other social 
factors  
Reflexivity (circularity)  
Responsive to plurality of interests  Self-observation  
Justification of legitimacy  Operating according to its own code  
Derives from institutional (e.g., 
organisational), occupational (e.g., legal 
profession) and procedural specialisation  
Derives from functional differentiation 
of subsystems  
Ideal of separation of powers and rule of 
law  
Maintaining evolutionary complexity 
and avoiding de-differentiation  
Limits of law’s ability to transcend 
political and economic interests  
Internal limits on law’s conditional 
programmes  
On an ontological axis, law can be seen 
as distinct from society according to the 
mainstream law and society studies (e.g., 
Kelsen: imputation versus causality 
theory)  
On an ontological axis, law can be seen 
as inseparable from society according to 
alternative law and society studies (e.g., 
Luhman, Teubner)  
On an epistemological axis, society can 
be seen as being independent of law as its 
object (e.g., theories of the capitalist 
mode of production, of social action, etc.) 
On an epistemological axis, law can be 
seen as a competing discourse with 
sociology (e.g., Teubner’s theory on 
reflexive law)  
 
  
 26 Nelken, D.: Changing paradigms in the sociology of law. In: Teubner, G. (ed.): 
Autopoietic law: A new approach to law and society. Berlin–New York, W. de Gruyter, 
1988. 196–197, 210.  
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(v) Table: Types and dimensions of modern legal rationality27  
 
Types  Dimensions  
Formal  Substantive  Reflexive  
Justification 
of law  
The perfection of 
individualism and 
autonomy: 
establishment of 
spheres of activity 
for private actors  
The collective 
regulation of economic 
and social activity, and 
compensation for 
market inadequacies  
Controlling self-
regulation: the 
coordination of 
recursively 
determined forms of 
social cooperation  
External 
functions of 
law  
Structural 
promises for the 
mobilisation and 
allocation of 
resources in a 
developed market-
oriented society 
and for the 
legitimation of the 
political system  
The instrumental 
modification of market-
determined patterns and 
structures of behaviour  
Structuring and 
restructuring systems 
for internal discourse 
and external 
coordination  
Internal 
structures of 
law  
Rule-orientation: 
conceptually 
constructed rules 
applied through 
deductive logic  
Purpose-orientation: 
purposive programmes 
of action implemented 
through regulations, 
standards and principles 
Procedure-
orientation: 
relationally oriented 
institutional 
structures and 
decision processes  
 
 
  
 27 Teubner, G.: Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law. Law and Society, 
Vol. 17, No. 2 (1983), 257.  
